Firms operate under a wide range of rules and regulations. These include, for example, environmental regulations (in which some industries have increased regulatory exposure) and finance and accounting (where all industries have reporting requirements). In other areas, such as antitrust cartels, enforcement is unregulated and antitrust leaves the market as the default tool to police against anti-competitive behavior. In all of these areas, detection of non-compliance by a firm can result in significant penalties. This issue of non-compliance has implications in the merger and acquisitions (M&A) context. In a transaction between an acquiring firm (buyer) and a target firm (seller), there is asymmetric information about the target's quality. In our framework, we link a target's quality directly to the strength of its regulatory compliance. In an M&A transaction, an acquirer seeks information about the target's compliance, as a compliance failure may result in substantial penalties and sanctions, post-acquisition. In the presence of quality (compliance) uncertainty about target firms, low quality targets can masquerade as high quality. This would tend to give rise to a M&A market with Lemons-like characteristics, resulting in low transactions prices and dampening of M&A activity. We examine how M&A transactions in such regulatory areas -environmental, finance and accounting, and antitrust compliance problems -might function to alleviate quality uncertainty.
Introduction
In this paper we examine markets for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) when firms are subject to myriad rules and regulations related to environmental, finance and accounting, and antitrust, among others. In a transaction between an acquiring firm (buyer) and a target firm (seller), there is asymmetric information. Our specific focus is on whether the target firm is compliant in a regulatory context. In our framework, we link a firm's quality to its regulatory compliance. In a merger and acquisition transaction, an acquirer seeks information about the target's compliance with regards to specific rules and regulations. Failure to do so may result in substantial penalties, post-acquisition.
Compliance has implications related to the M&A process, such as the purchase price and other contractual terms that shift risk between the parties. If a target is compliant (not in compliance), we consider this firm to be of high (low) quality. If the acquirer knows that the target is low quality (not in compliance), it will offer a low transaction price (or other risk shifting provisions) to compensate for potential post-acquisition monetary penalties and sanctions. In our framework, the baseline assumptions are that: (1) the target knows with certainty that it is high or low quality (that is, the firm is fully informed about whether it is in compliance or not); and (2) the acquirer may only have partial information and is uncertain about the target's quality. This presents a classic asymmetric quality information situation, with firm quality related to compliance. 1 We focus our discussion of compliance across three substantive and broadly defined regulatory fields: environmental, finance and accounting, and antitrust law.
Regulated firms operate under an information asymmetry with its regulators. However, the one area in which the asymmetry, upon first glance, might be reduced is in the M&A context.
As part of M&A deal-making, firms willingly open themselves to intensive due diligence by potential acquirers. In spite of increased due diligence, within a two to three year period after an M&A, details often emerge about regulatory risks not detected through due diligence. One recent example is the Hewlett-Packard 2011 acquisition of Autonomy, for which HewlettPackard paid $11 billion but within one year wrote down $8.8 billion because of accounting fraud on the part of Autonomy. The HP/Autonomy type story occurs often enough in the face of due diligence by investment bankers, accounting firms and law firms to suggest that detection of wrongdoing and non-compliance may be more difficult to detect that initial assumed. This persistent problem suggests that information asymmetries are significant even in the M&A context. This is the first paper to tie the Lemons problem involving information asymmetry to the M&A context in which the information asymmetry concerns compliance. Identifying better mechanisms to reduce information asymmetries has important policy implications to: 1.
Government regulation and enforcement, and 2. detection of compliance problems within the firm in the M&A context.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly note the Lemons problem, discuss issues related to asymmetric quality information, examine mechanisms to alleviate information asymmetries, and outline the complexities of M&A transactions when an acquirer is uncertainty about a target's quality, related to regulatory compliance. We also highlight various mechanisms by which a target can credibly signal its quality to a potential acquirer. In section 3
we examine selected areas of compliance, related to environmental, finance and accounting, and antitrust cartel behavior. In section 4 we offer some strategic considerations and in section 5 we conclude by noting and implications for M&As.
The Lemons Problem: Implications for M&As and Detection of Non-compliance
In this section we first elaborate on the Lemons market problem, the underlying theories of asymmetric information, quality uncertainty, and market mechanisms that may alleviate the information gaps and lead to more efficient functioning of markets. Next, we link the Lemons market literature to M&A transactions. While the academic literature has discussed the Lemons problem in the context of uncertain quality of products and services, we elaborate on the uncertain quality of the target firm by linking the firm's quality to whether or not it is in compliance with various rules and regulations that may be in place, set by Federal and/or State governments. In the context of asymmetric quality information, we discuss how the M&A transactions market has similarities and differences from the standard goods and services markets, and how the target and acquiring firms behave to address information gaps and make optimal decisions.
The Lemons problem
Adverse selection refers to a market process in which demand for high quality products are negatively affected when buyers and sellers have asymmetric information. As Stiglitz (2000) notes, there are two broad types of information where asymmetry is important: information about quality, and information about intent. Our focus is on quality. Under adverse selection, lower quality products tend to benefit because buyers are not able to differentiate between high versus low quality. This results in buyers only willing to pay an average price. Since sellers' profits are effectively decoupled from the quality of their products, they tend to sell only low quality products. In equilibrium, the market gravitates towards low quality only. This is referred to as a Lemons Market.
The Lemons literature has considered several examples of Lemons markets, such as those for used cars and insurance. Akerlof's (1970) classic paper illustrates this problem by examining the used car market where buyers have difficulty differentiating good quality cars from bad ones. This is different from the new car market as consumers are unable to judge a car based on its brand. A top new car brand such as BMW can be low, used, quality due to the previous owner's driving habits, driving conditions, maintenance, etc. In this market, only the seller may know the exact condition (quality) of the used cars, including problems which may show up after the buyer drives the car for a while. A seller has no incentive to inform the buyer about these problems as disclosure would have a negative impact on the transactions price. Under this situation, buyers will only offer an average price as they are unwilling to take the risk of getting a low quality used car and pay a higher than the average price. In equilibrium, the market will be filled with low quality used cars because the good quality cars will not receive the price premium they deserve.
Akerlof assumes that the demand for used cars depends on the price of the used cars (P) and the average quality of the used cars (µ . D represents demand and S represents supply.
Assume there are two groups of traders: groups one and two. The group one has the utility function U M ∑ x and the group two has the utility function U M ∑ 3/2x
where M is the consumption of other goods, x is the quality of the i th used car. When there is asymmetric information, the total demand is the sum of the demand from group one and two, and has the following structure:
The total supply is represented by S P N, with average quality µ P . If P 2µ, the demand of used cars will be zero. Overall, in a market with asymmetric information, adverse selection will lead to inefficiency and reduce social welfare.
The situation is different if there is symmetric information in the market. The supply relationship is: S N, if P 1; and S 0, if P 1. The structure of demand is given by:
, if 1 P ; and D 0, if P . The equilibrium will be:
information, there will be more utility gained because of the number of transactions increases compared to the market with asymmetric information.
2.1.a. Market mechanisms to alleviate the Lemons problem
To alleviate the Lemons problem, the literature has examined alternative mechanisms of exchange. When two parties in a transaction are confronted with asymmetric information, signaling serves as one of the important mechanisms to alleviate the Lemons market problem. Connelly et al. (2011) present an insightful review of the literature on signaling when two parties have asymmetric information about latent and unobservable quality. In Spence's (1973) classic paper, quality relates to the ability of a job applicant which is signaled by the level of education.
In other examples, quality relates to various goods and services transacted in the market: for example, the reliability and quality of a new car, quality of workmanship of an electrician, certificate is likely to be lower for high quality firms than for low quality ones. Firms with low quality will likely need to incur significant costs and make improvements to meet the standards.
3 Effective branding can reduce quality uncertainty. For instance, there are numerous MacDonald's along highways in the U.S. Travelers may choose MacDonald's instead of competing but unknown other fast food restaurants because they know the taste and they can trust this brand. 4 Akerlof noted that an important way to counteract the effects of quality uncertainty are guarantees which would reduce the uncertainty when consumers are making their decisions. An example could be of stores that sell second hand luxury goods such as Louis Vuitton, Gucci, etc. Normally consumers would be reluctant to buy from them because they worry they might get something fake. A guarantee from the store that anything fake will get a 100% refund reduces the uncertainty and attracts more consumers. 5 For example, the National Institute for Automotive Service Excellence (ASE) works to improve the quality of vehicle repair and service by testing and certifying automotive professionals. Automotive service centers with the ASE certification, therefore, provides some quality assurance. 6 A manufacturer may provide warranties for a wide range of new and used durable goods, and warranties for services performed by a range of professionals. 7 For example, in the market for residential houses, the public disclosure of home inspection results (Taylor, 1999) . 8 Anderson et al. (1999) , Bénézech at al. (2001) , Buttle (1997) , Corbett et al. (2005) and Terlaak and King (2006) .
A firm that obtains an ISO 9000 certificate therefore sends a credible (having incurred the cost) and clearly observed signal.
Advertising, branding and reputation are common quality signaling mechanisms. In other types of mechanisms, new, younger, firms may signal quality via private equity markets. This positive signal is observable and credible. However, the signal may gain or lose strength depending on the intertemporal performance of the firm. Finally, the number of patents may be a signal for a firm to show its innovative abilities to outsiders. An innovation portfolio based signal is costly and time consuming to develop, and difficult to mimic.
In summary, the literature has typically considered two mechanisms for alleviating the inefficiencies caused by information asymmetry: signaling and screening. Informed sellers with high quality products need to signal the quality of their products (e.g., via warranties, costly advertisement, reputation building, etc). On the other hand, uninformed buyers need to screen the high quality products from bad ones (e.g., via insurance deductibles).
The Lemons problem and M&As
In the above discussion, we examined a range of issues related to the quality of products and services offered by firms. We also noted that a firm's overall quality matters. For example, we discussed how an ISO 9000 certification signals quality of organization, managerial and production practices. In this scenario, firms with ISO 9000 certification will be viewed by markets as higher quality.
In this paper we are concerned about markets for mergers and acquisitions. In such markets, there is a transaction between an acquiring firm (buyer) and a target firm (seller). As part of this transaction, there is asymmetric information. Our specific focus is on whether the target firm is compliant in a regulatory context. Firms are subject to myriad rules and regulations related to environment, finance and accounting, and antitrust among others.
Unlike the standard product and services markets we discussed ealier, in the context of M&As, the target typically has to offer all available information to the acquirer to consummate a deal. In the area of environmental regulations, a target can offer data and information on Table 1 , one way to think of the total penalty for violation is the amount of the fine plus mandates for installation of pollution control devices.
The total penalty ranges from lows of less than $100,000 to highs of over $40 million. The range of industries is wide, ranging from glass products, animal feed and gravel producers, to very large manufacturing firms in petroleum refining and electric utility. Overall, Table 1 reveals that there is considerable variance in total penalties and type of industries. In our M&A context, and relating quality of the firm to compliance, the wide range of penalties and industries implies that acquiring firms have to be careful in assessing a target's level of environmental compliance.
In contrast to environmental regulations, the broad area of financial and accounting compliance is more complex, and one in which significant information asymmetries can remain between the target and the acquiring firm. Costly verification by the acquirer, for example by hiring a financial-accounting firm to examine balance sheets and records, is unlikely to remove some of the important information gaps. Specific about exact accounting practices, financial transactions, insider trading, misrepresentation of costs and revenues, foreign corrupt practices, among others, are very difficult to verify. This is an area where even the target firm, depending on its organizational and managerial complexity and size, may not be fully informed about activities within the firm.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, provides oversight on a range of financial and accounting regulations. Actions related to insider trading and accounting fraud are common, and encompass nearly all industries (Cumming and Johan, 201; Yu, 2013) . In recent years, an important area of enforcement relates to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). (Table 2) shows that the fines levied are on average much larger than those observed in Table 1 . This implies that acquiring firms have to be even more concerned about potential FCPA compliance than those in the environmental category.
Finally, Table 3 provides information on selected SEC enforcement and fines related to the more general financial and accounting areas. As with the FCPA violations, the range of industries is diverse and the fines large.
What complicates matters is that in environmental regulations, firms have to put in place numerous checks and balances on production and polluting equipment to record emissions, and these data are monitored and reported. For FCPA and other types of financial and accounting violations, potential wrongdoing can occur over a much wider range of activities and are often individual specific, making it very difficult for a firm to know whether it is compliance or not.
This implies that the quality (compliance) uncertainty is even higher in the FCPA and financialaccounting areas, and a considerable risk for the acquiring firm.
Finally, the third area we consider, collusive practices, is even more complex than the above two categories. While collusion is illegal per se, there is no regulatory body (like EPA or SEC in the above examples) which have mandated standards and routine compliance requirements. Given the covert nature of collusion, even costly verification is unlikely to narrow the information gap. We provide in Table 4 an example of the air cargo cartel and US and European government imposed fines for cartel participants. The sheer number of firms engaged in the cartel and total fines levied is breathtaking. Fines collected overall in the air cargo cartel globally across government and private enforcement efforts exceeds $4 billion. The information on cartels and fines imposed presented in Levenstein and Suslow (2011) provide a broader look at antitrust cartels.
2.2.b. Acquirer, target and information gap
In the absence of mechanisms that reduce information asymmetry, M&A transactions would decline, just like in the classic Lemons problem. However, as in markets for goods and services, targets and acquirers have alternative channels to signal and communicate quality attributes.
In section 2.1 we discussed various strategies by firms to signal information about quality. In the case of financial and accounting compliance, a target firm may engage in costly certification procedures to convince the acquirer of its quality. In the environmental compliance area, a target can provide all Federal and State mandated compliance data. The EPA (EPA, 1998) provides protocols for compliance and liability, and a target can incur costs and use these protocols to provide credible quality assurance. An acquirer can also verify compliance based on established protocols and avail of expert services to validate. A low quality firm, one with financial, accounting or environmental compliance problems, may attempt to mimic a high quality firm, but success is not guaranteed as the acquirer can also avail of services of experts in financial-accounting and environmental certification firms to validate quality. 12 Overall, there exist mechanisms by which a target can credibly, by incurring costs, signal quality. This reduces the information gap and facilitates M&A transactions.
In the case of antitrust collusion, verification is very difficult. Incurring costs, as in the environmental and financial-accounting cases, is unlikely to reduce the information asymmetry as to whether the target is in a cartel. The most that might be done would be the use of econometric screens to examine an entire industry. When done correctly, such screens might reduce the compliance asymmetry not merely for the particular target but for the entire industry.
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Compliance and enforcement risk is well understood in the M&A contracting context.
There are complex representations and warrantees to deal with this along with significant due diligence (Gilson and Schwartz, 2005) . That is, it is possible to solve the problem of asymmetric uncertainty through contracting.
Even with contractual guarantees, deals get completed regardless of the specific provisions of such representations and warranties (short of regulatory blow up) because once parties are committed, they may want to push a deal forward. Thus, provisions that may serve to protect acquirers from a target's non-compliance are not always enforced (Manns and Anderson, 2012) . This only exacerbates the Lemons problem.
Target firms and non-compliance
A firm may undertake illegal behavior and non-compliance, based on the relative costs and benefits of compliance (Helland, 1998) . We have chosen three different types of compliance areas, each of which represents a different type of enforcement mechanism and complexity.
Before exploring these three areas of law and regulation, we note generally that the legal landscape is not static and depends on changes in administration, changes in case law and regulations. Moreover, there are different kinds of violations. Some are highly technical but can be fixed relatively easily and sometimes do not need to be reported, whereas other types of compliance require a serious regulatory aspect with significant coordination and reporting to government counterparts.
As we noted in Section 2.2 above, the first area which we examine is environmental regulation. The second area is securities and accounting related fraud (including FCPA), and the third is antitrust cartels. In each of these three areas, compliance issues arise at multiple levels of government. There is some federal enforcement and some state level enforcement.
However, it is not direct government enforcement that is the primary method of compliance for firms. There has been a move away from traditional public enforcement towards privatizing enforcement in which self-regulation, self-enforcement and self-reporting of wrongdoing is playing a larger role (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992). Self-policing is a method to optimize regulation (Innes, 1999; Kaplow and Shavell, 1994) . It privatizes enforcement by pushing enforcement and compliance from the regulator to the regulated firm. Firms report their compliance failures to the government. In each of the three areas, self-policing plays a role in detection of wrongdoing and of compliance failures.
Selected areas of compliance and non-compliance in target firms

Creating compliance mechanisms
The creation and of internal compliance mechanisms and structures is one way in which firms attempt to regulate themselves against legal/regulatory wrongdoing. Sometimes the creation of compliance mechanisms is merely symbolic (Edelman, 1990) . However, firm expenditures on compliance may suggest significant commitment to ensure that there is no corporate wrongdoing.
3.1.a. Disclosure
A firm can mitigate uncertainty of its value through disclosure. Disclosure and transparency are a signaling mechanism, as they can credibly reduce information asymmetries.
The market is likely to view firms with greater environmental disclosure as being better able to manage future regulatory costs. Blacconiere and Patten (1994) find that the greater the disclosure of firms prior to an industry-wide crisis (not specific to that firm), the less severe the market reaction. Firms that perform well in their environmental compliance can signal this through better disclosure (Clarkson et al., 2008) . The information is a signal not merely to existing (shareholders) but to potential acquirers.
Mandatory disclosure regimes also add transparency to a firm's activities. The disclosure of information reduces information costs for stakeholders. This has an economic impact as it may put pressure on firms to improve their performance (Chatterji and Toffel, 2010) due to an increased chance of regulatory enforcement.
3.1.b. Investment in Compliance
Companies may choose to make a significant investment in compliance. The motivation to add more rigorous compliance comes from multiple directions. More compliance may be a function of changes in regulation and a firm's ability to arbitrage this discontinuity to its advantage over its competitors. A firm may be able to take advantage of changes in the regulatory environment to become more compliant for competitive advantage (Nehrt, 1996 and or as a result in a shift in regulatory risk assessment.
Pressure may come from outside stakeholders such as activists and non-governmental organizations. Companies might channel stakeholder concerns into a branding and reputational boost based on "good" governance and strong compliance. The greater the engagement with outside stakeholders, the greater the potential support in political and regulatory settings for companies. Companies would not seek such support unless they believed that they had dealt with compliance problems adequately. That is, stakeholder involvement is a form of political capital expenditure (Henisz et al., 2012) . Such expenditure will show better returns if a company creates a compliance infrastructure to ensure that the political capital expenditures are not wasted due to poor compliance decisions.
Environmental compliance
The nature of issues that arise in the environmental context will vary across industries, with some industries more heavily regulated than others based on their environmental profile.
There are a number of industries in which pollution is common. This includes industries such as electric generation, chemicals, and pulp and paper, among others.
Firms are only willing to undertake significant efforts at environmental self-compliance if in fact they will benefit from such auditing. Should significant compliance lead to increased penalties from the government, there are incentives for firms not to undertake significant compliance (Arlen, 1994; Pfaff and Sanchirco, 2000) .
To a certain extent, potential acquirers are well versed in environmental due diligence and how to address it within the acquisition context. Environmental due diligence entails a review of past environmental issues, current non-compliance and the costs of getting the target firm into compliance. Environmental due diligence in the M&A context may consist of Phase I,II, III and IV site assessments and remediations.
In spite of potential due diligence, Lemons problems emerge consistently through M&A environmental transactions. Additionally, some firms may want to signal strong compliance but cannot. There is particular difficulty in valuing environmental compliance and performance because of the uncertainty of future litigation and regulatory costs as well as because of agency cost problems within the firm (Ambec and Barla, 2002; Reinhardt, 2000) .
Firm Structure
The structure of corporate governance of a firm may be an indicator of compliance with environmental issues. Walls et al. (2012) show relationships regarding smaller and more diverse boards leading to better environmental performance (with performance being based on environmental violations). They also found that firms with highly compensated CEOs tend to have worse environmental records. Other work suggests that the likelihood of being named a defendant in an environmental lawsuit increases with the size of the board, the percent of members of the board of directors from industrial firms, and with the percentage of insider ownership in the firm, whereas it decreases with an higher percentage of outside directors (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002) .
Conformity of environmental compliance policies across different subsidiaries of the firm may signal compliance strength. Firms who make acquisitions in countries with lower environmental standards but who use the same compliance standard globally enhances firm value as measured by Tobin's Q (Dowell et al., 2000) . Other empirical work suggests that it pays to be a highly compliant firm on environmental issues (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) .
Stakeholder involvement
One factor that influences target quality on environmental compliance might be broader stakeholder involvement of customers, suppliers and environmental groups (Anton and Deltas, 2004; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Berchicci and King, 2007) . A number of factors may explain this relationship. The greater the investment with stakeholders the greater the likelihood that a company has less to hide, that it is constrained in its ability to commit non-compliant behavior.
Firms may commit to additional monitoring expenditures. They may do so because stakeholder involvement serves as a pre-commitment device for more intense compliance. Thus, by building relationships with stakeholders a firm creates increased potential reputational damage for its future wrongdoing.
Financial and Accounting Fraud
Unlike environmental regulation, in which the risk of non-compliance is more likely to be industry specific, the issue of accounting fraud and related issues such as bribery (FCPA) relate to companies across all industries. By its nature, accounting is highly regulated. All publicly traded firms have reporting requirements and spend significant resources on both internal and external (accounting and law) compliance functions.
The Lemons problem may be significant in terms of accounting compliance. An acquirer's ability to get accurate financial information about the target is essential to making a merger's success. Yet, M&A of publicly traded targets tend to be wealth destroying or wealth neutral (Andrade et al., 2001 ). 14 Notwithstanding these other issues regarding poor decisionmaking that motivates M&A, if the quality of financial reporting is poor, this is a compliance problem and it may lead to poor evaluation of a target firm (Aboody et al., 2005) . To overcome the Lemons problem, target firms can signal compliance quality by opening themselves up to potential acquirers to help reduce information asymmetries (Eso and Szentes, 2007) . In other situations, poor financial reporting may lead to situations of a winner's curse (Barberis and Thaler, 2006) .
Economic incentives may be such that a manager might cover up an accounting problem for gain. However, in the long term the accounting irregularities often are found and noncompliance punished. Accounting frauds tend to be discovered when "gains" can no longer be sustained. The same type of concerns of fraud also emerges in other areas of regulation of financial information, such as the FCPA.
Firm Structure
Corporate governance and various incentives structures may explain the probability of wrongdoing for securities/accounting issues. Good corporate governance provides a signal of a higher quality firm regarding compliance. For example, a higher percentage of independent outside directors positively correlates to a lower corporate fraud (Beasley, 1996 and Uzun et al., 2004) as well as opportunistic grants of stock options (Bebchuk et al., 2010) .
The amount of pay for performance may be another signal of the potential risk of accounting compliance problems of a target firm. In some cases pay for performance better aligns managers' incentives with those of the firm (Baber et al., 1996; Morgan and Poulsen, 2001 ). However, too much short-term gain may increase the agency costs within a firm (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) .
Non-linearities in payoffs may encourage fraud. CEOs whose pay is significantly incentive-based are more likely to commit fraud by misreporting material information or manipulating earnings (Berhstresser and Phillippon, 2006; Peng and Roel, 2008; Johnson et al. 2009; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Schnatterly, 2003) . CFO bonuses and stock options have also been empirically linked to manipulation of earnings (Oberholzer-Gee and Wulf, 2012).
Stakeholder involvement
Stakeholder involvement in the securities/fraud context allows firms to signal to investors engagement between a firm and its stakeholders. Corporate social responsibility efforts are attempts by firms to show that they have goals other than a narrow profit maximizing one.
However, most of the CSR movement focuses on issues such as environmental, labor and human rights concerns rather than on discussions with stakeholders about corporate accounting wrongdoing. To the extent that there is engagement with the CSR movement, corporations feel pressure to conform to CSR demands (Aguilera et al., 2007) . In the corporate governance arena, these demands include "better" corporate governance that reduces incentives of individuals within firms to maximize profit. To the extent that CSR creates incentives within the firm to reduce moral wrongdoing, then firms with increased engagement with CSR groups should be those that have higher quality governance since they have less to hide than firms that engage in accounting and FCPA non-compliance.
Cartels
A cartel involves price fixing, market allocation, or bid rigging and involves collusion to multiple firms in a market. The cartel members in effect set a price above the market price to secure monopoly rents. Unlike environmental or accounting issues, cartel enforcement is highly unregulated. Antitrust leaves the market as the default tool to police against anti-competitive behavior (Hovenkamp, 2006) . Because the market is the default in antitrust, there is no periodic reporting requirement akin to environmental or securities law. When firms reap illegal monopoly profits (such as through cartel behavior) that antitrust enforcement may be triggered (Blair and Knight, 2013; Dnes, 2013) .
Collusion and cartel participation may happen within a stable industry. However, cartel activity also may occur as a consequence of a merger. The DOJ/FTC 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines set out the possibility of illegal coordinated effects post-merger of remaining firms in an industry, noting that "Coordinated interaction can involve the explicit negotiation of a common understanding of how firms will compete or refrain from competing. Such conduct typically would itself violate the antitrust laws." In other cases, it is the M&A itself in which an acquirer fails to detect that the target firm is part of a cartel.
Cartel compliance is different from other forms of compliance for which there are criminal sanctions such as environmental or securities regulation. Unlike other areas of white collar crime, antitrust does not allow for penalty mitigation for an effective compliance program as contemplated under the US Sentencing Guidelines (Sokol, 2013) . In cartel enforcement, a company must plead guilty as part of its settlement. In other areas of white collar crime, a firm will not enter a guilty plea but instead will enter into a deferred prosecution agreement or nonprosecution agreement so as not to admit wrongdoing.
Cartel participation is difficult to detect and punish (Combe and Monnier, 2011, Connor and Lande, 2012) . The low level of detection and punishment may affect the risk/reward calculation of a particular manager to participate in a cartel. The small number of people needed in a given firm to participate in a cartel also means that across firms, cartel conduct can be coordinated across a small set of players. As a result, companies often do not sufficiently invest in antitrust cartel compliance. Therefore, companies are not well tasked to deal with this detection threat even if the penalties when detected can be severe, such as the $4 billion in penalties collected thus far globally for air cargo cartel.
The discussion of the air cargo cartel provides an example of how antitrust penalties for cartel behavior work. Under the Sherman Act, US antitrust law provides for a mix of criminal and civil penalties. These penalties are at both the firm and individual level. The air cargo cartel (which was actually a number of cartels depending on the particular country market involved)
provides an example of the compliance failures on a massive scale given the number of large and sophisticated companies involved in the cartel. (Sokol, 2013) .
From the standpoint of compliance, the application of the leniency program does not reward the adoption of a strong anti-cartel compliance program. 15 DOJ Antitrust views a leniency request as failed compliance because the firm was involved in a cartel. Normally, the rationale for such a penalty reduction for self reporting is to encourage companies to undertake self regulation and be rewarded for creating a compliance infrastructure that promotes good governance. The penalty reduction allows for an optimal blend of strict liability and negligence to ensure that firms have enough incentive to invest in compliance programs (Arlen and Kraakman, 1997; Arlen, 1994) . Thus, the leniency program utilizes a strict liability regime for determining punishment. There is very little academic work on firm incentives and firm structure specific to cartels. While there is some literature on incentives for managerial effort and industry competition (Scharfstein, 1988; Schmidt, 1997) , the literature on firm structure and incentives in the cartel context is small. The empirical work to date on managerial incentives and cartels analyze managerial compensation among 796 Japanese firms from 1968 to 1992 (Joh, 1999 ) and a sample of German firms involved in coal cartels from 1881 -1913 (Burhop and Lubbers, 2009 ).
Firm Structure
Some theoretical work, such as Aubert (2007) , analyzes the interaction of managerial incentives with efforts at collusion. In this model, collusion may substitute for increased managerial effort. Due to incentives to collude, firms may behave inefficiently which creates even more incentive to collude, since firms cannot easily control the actions of their employees.
In other theoretical work, Spagnolo (2000) provides a binding contract from the firm to the manager to support tacit collusion. In further work, Spagnolo (2005) suggests that a firm might hire a manager with a preference for income smoothing, thus creating an incentive to "meet the numbers" via a cartel.
Two recent theoretical works offer some policy solutions. Angelucci and Han (2010) suggest that for a cartel compliance program to be effective, managerial sanctions need to be low. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2008) argue that cartel enforcement should change managerial incentives via financial penalties to shareholders through a dilution of shares so that if managers.
Thus, if firms undertake cartel activity through poorly aligned incentives, shareholders would be punished.
Stakeholder Involvement
Because antitrust is not regulatory in nature, there is not the type of stakeholder involvement with firms within antitrust akin to environmental or securities related issues.
Moreover, the problem of cartels is one in which all of the major players of an industry are by definition parties to criminal wrongdoing so that stakeholder outreach is less important as a signaling mechanism since there is no competitive advantage that such signaling can offer a firm relative to its competitors.
Strategic implications
Two strategic implications emerge from this paper. The first relates to public enforcement and its interplay with private enforcement. If the market via M&As can attain part or most of the compliance/enforcement objectives, what is the optimal role of Government?
That is, how much direct government enforcement is appropriate to achieve greater compliance?
The second strategic implication relates to firms and their governance. If a firm can change its internal managerial incentives and organizational structures to increase the likelihood of strong legal compliance, then the types of emphasis that M&A due diligence normally undertakes misses critical factors that could better spot potential legal liabilities and change bargaining dynamics in contracting in the M&A context.
Conclusion
This paper applies the Lemons problem to information asymmetries regarding regulatory compliance in the M&A context. We apply this model to three types of legal contexts: strong industry specific regulation (environmental), strong general regulation (accounting fraud and FCPA) and general unregulated illegal conduct (antitrust). The mechanisms for signaling high compliance to reduce information asymmetries differ in strength depending on the specific type of substantive area of regulation. We identify factors that might be used to help identify potential lemons in the M&A context. 
